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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the United States Army doctrine 
regarding the movement of 40 foot containers in a contingency theater of 
operations. This thesis provides an overview of past challenges presented when 
shipping 40 foot containers to military operations, as well as current force 
development trends that are applicable to the movement of 40 foot containers. It 
examines the effects of employing 40 foot containers on the tactical maneuver units 
as well as the combat service support and transportation corps functions. Various 
options are presented regarding the desired locations to ship 40 foot containers, 
examining the tradeoffs inherent in each option as they pertain to tactical and 
operational mission accomplishment of combat and combat service support units. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Transportation of equipment and cargo required by the 
United States Army has long presented challenges to the 
military community within the combat service support field. 
Specifically, the transition to the intermodal container for 
movement of supplies and equipment has brought with it many 
challenges as well as efficiencies with which to deal. Among 
these challenges is the attempt by logisticians to gain 
increased cargo handling efficiency through the use of 
containers in transporting supplies and equipment. The 
containerization movement includes the use of 40 foot 
containers to transport unit equipment and supplies to 
contingency theaters of operation. This study is an analysis 
of the use of 40 foot containers in transporting unit 
equipment and supplies to Army units in a contingency theater 
of operations. The area of research is focused toward the 
Army Transportation Corps and how incorporating 40 foot 
containers into the transportation plan impacts units being 
supported as well as the transportation corps. 
B. PROBLEM 
The objective of this analysis is to review the movement 
of unit equipment by 40 foot container. Furthermore, this 
thesis will present different options available to 
transportation agencies for the use of 40 foot containers and 
the tradeoffs associated with choosing a particular option. 
The goal of this tradeoff analysis is to provide commanders in 
the field more complete information regarding the integration 
of 40 foot containers into the overall transportation plan. 
This thesis will explore many questions surrounding the 
employment of 40 foot containers in a theater of operations. 
These questions include: 
• What is the current procedure regarding movement of 40 
foot containers in a theater of operations? 
• What are the tradeoffs associated with moving 40 foot 
containers to different organizational levels in a 
theater of operations? 
• Assuming proposed force structure changes are adopted 
regarding Army transportation units, what effect, if 
any, will the new structure have upon the movement of 
40 foot containers? 
• Is there a unit level boundary across which a 40 foot 
container should not travel? 
• Are there benefits to the Army in either limiting the 
movement or allowing the free travel of 40 foot 
containers in a theater of operations? 
C.  SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Because of the extensive varieties and models of 
containers available for transportation missions, the scope of 
study and analysis must be limited in nature. Therefore, the 
discussion will be directed toward 40 foot general cargo 
containers. The 2 0 foot container is clearly an integral part 
of the future transportation mission. (Gipson, Interview, 
1994) However, the future role of the 40 foot container is 
not so easily delineated. (DCSLOG, Information Brief, 6 April 
1994) 
Furthermore, this thesis will discuss deployment and 
sustainment of military units in a contingency theater of 
operations only. During peacetime, time and resource 
constraints are not as critical when moving materiel via 
intermodal carriers. As a result, the use of 40 foot 
containers in peacetime operations is a viable alternative for 
shipments requiring the volume necessary to fill a 40 foot 
container. 
Additionally, the discussion will focus on Army units 
only,  since a multi-service approach would involve varying 
doctrines regarding unit organizations and contingencies too 
broad to provide effective study. 
The three primary areas of interest for the purpose of 
this thesis are initial surge deployment of organic unit 
equipment, initial surge of military supplies to the theater, 
and the continued resupply of a mature theater of operations. 
In these discussions, the subject of ammunition movement will 
be treated as a mode of shipment requiring specialized 
containers and, therefore, will not be discussed in great 
detail. 
This thesis will be primarily conceptual in nature, with 
information regarding possible options and the tradeoffs of 
each option outlined. A more specific discussion is precluded 
by the vast number of scenarios which are conceivable and the 
permutations which may arise based upon available material 
handling equipment, etc. Therefore, no optimal solution 
exists for such broad considerations. It is assumed that 
those who read or use this thesis will be somewhat familiar 
with the terms and doctrines of the United States Army and, 
more specifically, the Transportation Corps. 
Several assumptions are relevant to the discussion of 
this thesis. An initial assumption focuses upon the force 
modernization and doctrinal changes occurring in the Army 
Transportation Corps. This thesis is formed under the 
assumption that proposed force modernization issues discussed 
later will be approved and implemented by the Army. 
Furthermore, the new equipment proposed under these 
modernizations will eventually be fielded to Army units. An 
additional assumption is that maintaining a high element of 
customer satisfaction remains a cornerstone of the guidelines 
for successful execution of the transportation mission within 
the Army. Therefore, proposed options should attempt to 
maintain or improve current levels of customer satisfaction 
while remaining feasible in their execution. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Since this thesis analyzes and discusses container policy 
regarding employment of 40 foot containers, data was obtained 
through coordination with various agencies in the 
transportation field. Chief among them was the Combined Arms 
Support Command (CASCOM), as well as personal interviews with 
transportation and logistics officers in major commands 
throughout the Army. Finally, information was received from 
Headquarters, Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), and 
the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). This data was 
used to form the basis for developing possible courses of 
action available to responsible agencies for employing 40 foot 
containers in the transportation plan. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter II will provide a background of containerization 
in the military as well as the new force structures being 
proposed which affect the container transportation mission. 
Chapter III will discuss the model developed for use in 
deriving courses of action regarding container employment. 
Included in this chapter will be the criteria developed for 
creation of the model. 
Chapter IV will examine the different courses of action 
presented and discuss the tradeoffs associated with each 
option. This chapter will provide detailed analysis regarding 
the decisions to ship containers to specified echelons in the 
theater of operations. 
Chapter V will be comprised of the conclusions and 
recommendations for future action. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Containerization in the military has passed through many 
refinements in an attempt to streamline the transportation 
process while improving the timeliness of delivery of supplies 
and equipment to the unit commanders. Even now this topic is 
fluid, with numerous papers being drafted by the Combined Arms 
Support Command (CASCOM) at Fort Lee, Virginia as well as 
other organizations within the Department of Defense. 
When the further effects of military drawdown and budget 
reductions are factored into the problem, it becomes much more 
crucial to refine the transportation process to the maximum 
extent possible. This thesis will now provide a brief 
discussion of containerization in the military as well as 
proposed force modernization trends being explored to adapt to 
the changing military environment with which we are now faced. 
A.  CONTAINERIZATION IN THE MILITARY 
1.  Types of Containers 
There are many different sizes and types of containers 
available for use in transporting equipment and supplies. 
This thesis focuses upon the 40 foot International Standards 
Organization (ISO) container. However, the issue of container 
ownership is also a factor in determining where to ship 
containers. In this context, containers can be owned by the 
military or commercially. If owned by the military, the 
military keeps possession of containers even when empty and is 
responsible for their maintenance and upkeep. If commercially 
owned, the military merely rents containers for a specified 
amount of time. The containers used during the surge portion 
of Operation Desert Shield were primarily military owned, 
whereas the containers used for sustainment operations were 
commercially owned.  (Green:  p.19) 
A drawback of commercially owned containers is the issue 
of detention, or late charges in returning a container to the 
shipper. While we will discuss this aspect later, it is 
worthy to note that detention charges may influence decisions 
regarding how far forward to move containers in a theater of 
operations. Logically, a container will be delayed longer by 
traveling to lower echelons than it will if it is immediately 
unloaded and returned to the carrier at the port. 
2.  Initial Stages 
Containerization may be traced for ocean going purposes 
to an initial experiment by Pan Atlantic Steamship 
Corporation, now known as Sea-Land Services, in 1956. 
Trucking executive Malcolm McLean used two converted tanker 
ships, loaded containers aboard them, and the concept of 
intermodal transit of goods began. However, as Müller notes, 
the blend of true intermodalism, with interchangeable land and 
sea handling efficiencies, did not flourish for many years. 
(Müller:  p.13) 
Prior to 1956, ocean going shipments of equipment and 
other goods were transported by breakbulk ships, loading and 
unloading palletized cargo individually over the side of the 
ship. Such ships were relatively small, took a large crew of 
stevedores to load and unload the cargo, required vast 
quantities of blocking and bracing material to secure the 
cargo, and were very inefficient by today's standards. This 
point is significant, since Operations Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm used a relatively high percentage of breakbulk 
ships to deliver cargo, nearly 35 years after the 
containerization movement began.  (Müller:  p.18) 
In the civilian market, containers have experienced 
increasing popularity and growth to the present. As Müller 
summarizes : 
By  1973,  transatlantic  trade  consisted almost 
entirely of cargo carried by containership and roll 
on-roll off (ro-ro) vessels except for bulk cargo 
in bulk cargo ships. Breakbulk vessels were almost 
completely squeezed out of the transatlantic 
market, except in certain cases where size and 
other characteristics of the cargo did not conform 
to standard container sizes. (Müller:  p.17) 
Well over 60 percent of the world's deep sea 
general cargo today moves in containers. The 
percentage of containerized cargo is even higher 
between developed countries, approaching nearly 10 0 
percent in some cases.  (Müller:  p.20) 
Department of Defense instructions reflected the growing 
popularity of containers with the issuance of DoD Instruction 
4500.37, Management of the DoD Intermodal Container System, 
dated 2 April 1987. The Instruction seated that containerized 
shipment would be the preferred method, unless cost 
effectiveness or peculiar shipment requirements are an 
overriding factor.  (DoD Instruction 4500.37:  1987) 
When the average ship loading and unloading times are 
compared, it is easy to understand why container ships have 
grown in popularity over the years. The average breakbulk 
ship carries 17,000 measurement tons and takes four days to 
load and four days to unload. On the other hand, a container 
ship carries an average of 25,000 measurement tons, takes one 
to two days to load and one to two days to offload. (MTMCTEA 
Pam 700-2:  p.33) 
A further factor to consider in the transition from 
breakbulk ship to container ship is the vessel size. 
Breakbulk ships are generally smaller than their current 
container and ro-ro counterparts. As a result, more ships are 
needed to transport the same amount of cargo that is now 
shipped by container. This translates into more fuel, more 
crew costs, higher ship maintenance costs, and lower 
efficiency for the cargo moved. (RAND:  p.4) 
3. Ready Reserve Force 
As the commercial shipping companies moved toward 
containerization, the availability of breakbulk ships began to 
decline. The military, possibly forecasting a future shortage 
of sealift assets to support contingency operations, bought a 
large number of breakbulk ships and stored them in the Ready 
Reserve Force (RRF) . As stated in the Center for Naval 
Analyses Research Memorandum 91-109: 
The Ready Reserve Force is a fleet of militarily 
useful ships that were purchased by the Navy in the 
1980 's. The RRF consists of 96 ships, including 17 
RO-ROs, 48 breakbulk cargo ships, and an assortment 
of others like tankers and barge carriers. In 
peacetime, RRF ships are laid up in a 
nonoperational status under the control of the 
Maritime Administration (MARAD). When called up, 
ships must be towed to a nearby shipyard for 
mechanical preparations, and crews must be drawn 
from available U.S. merchant mariners before the 
ship is turned over to Military Sealift Command 
(MSC) for operation. The ships in the RRF are split 
into three groups: those that should be available 
to activate within five days, within ten days, and 
within 20 days. As Desert Shield began, 65 ships 
were in five day status, 2 8 were in ten day status, 
and three were in 20 day status. (Center For Naval 
Analyses Research Memorandum 91-109: p.11) 
As we will see below, the shipment of cargo by breakbulk 
was significant during Operations Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm. However, the RRF did not meet initial readiness 
expectations, with ships taking much longer than planned to 
mobilize. As a result, commercial U.S. and foreign flag 
carriers shouldered much of the sealift burden.  (RAND: p. 13) 
4. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm 
The events of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm 
prove how dependent upon the commercial sector the military is 
for  sealift  support.    During Operation Desert  Shield, 
3,800,000 tons of dry cargo was shipped by sea. Of this 
amount, 2 0 percent was shipped by container ships. (Mitre 
Corporation:  1991) 
With such a large amount of supplies moving by breakbulk 
ship, the load on the logistics system was increased regarding 
the manpower requirements to handle the palletized cargo. 
This cargo was transshipped at the sea port of debarkation, 
moved to a storage area and unloaded from trucks, sorted by 
unit, and then moved to a further storage area at the corps 
area. From there, it was handled again, offloaded from the 
truck and placed in a holding area for units to pick up. This 
move is contrasted by the ideally packed and marked 2 0 or 40 
foot container, which moved from the port directly to the 
corps storage area or to the division owning the equipment. 
(Gipson, Interview, 1994) The cargo handling efficiency 
differences are apparent in this example. 
Part of the reason for a lack of container ship usage was 
the consideration that no formal doctrine existed which 
discussed the use of commercial ships in a practical manner. 
The system was not completely in place to get containerships 
on short notice without disrupting the commercial 
transportation system. Therefore, the military reverted to 
the breakbulk methods tried and proven in the past. (Cochran, 
Interview, 1995) 
A further consideration in the large number of breakbulk 
ships used was the lack of a significant inventory of U.S. 
flagged ro-ro vessels. The military is required to move on 
U.S. flag carriers with U.S. crews under normal conditions. 
Most of the ro-ro and container vessels available for use 
during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were either 
foreign flagged or foreign crewed. Thus, the RRF became the 
only available short notice choice. (Cochran, Interview, 1995) 
5. Mobility Requirements Study 
As part of the solution to the labor intensive breakbulk 
operations, the Department of Defense directed a Mobility 
Requirements Study be undertaken in 1991. The Mobility 
Requirements Study determined that sealift capacity was 
inadequate to meet future sealift contingency needs. It 
recommended the purchase of 19 Large Medium Speed Roll-on 
Roll-off vessels (LMSRs). These vessels would provide 
adequate lift capacity to meet future operations without 
reliance on the breakbulk ships as was the case during 
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Also recommended 
was the pre-positioning of equipment and containers in various 
locations worldwide. This aspect will be discussed in a 
subsequent section. (Price, Interview, 1995) 
6. Industry Trends 
The container industry continues to move toward areas of 
efficiency and increased productivity. As stated by Coyle, 
Bardi and Cavinato: 
The time would appear ripe for significant growth 
in intermodal traffic.  Railroads, airlines, motor 
carriers, and water carriers have all shown signs 
of their service in the intermodal area.  (Coyle, 
Bardi, and Cavinato:  p.469) 
A by-product of this move is the preference by commercial 
ocean carriers of the 40 foot container instead of the 2 0 foot 
size. This push toward the larger size has been occurring 
since the 1980's but is again receiving attention in the 
military community. The 40 foot container is more efficient 
for commercial carriers to transport because of the reduced 
number of handlings to move the same amount of equipment. A 
40 foot container requires only one move to load or unload 
from a ship, whereas two 2 0 foot containers must be moved to 
lift the same volume or weight. (Pittman, Interview, 1995) 
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7.  Army Doctrinal Developments 
a. Unitization 
Just as their civilian counterparts have done, the 
military is attempting to increase efficiency in container and 
cargo handling operations. A key development is the concept 
of unitization of cargo. 
Unitization refers to the shipping of a full package 
of a particular commodity in a container for a specific 
organization. Using food as an example, the current method of 
shipment is to fill a container to capacity with a single 
commodity, such as a breakfast meal. The full container of 
breakfast then moves to a staging location, where it is 
unloaded, divided into smaller sections, palletized with the 
lunches and dinners that arrived in separate containers, and 
then shipped to the final destinations. The unitization 
concept would ship all of the meals as a group, putting 
breakfast, lunch and dinner in a single container. In this 
manner, the forward locations would be required to handle only 
one container instead of three. (Fox, Interview, 1995) 
An important factor in the unitization effort is 
loading containers to capacity. When a load prepared for 
shipment is less than a container load, the shipper must take 
the cargo to a container control point, where it will be 
loaded with other items to make a full container load. The 
fully loaded container would then be shipped to the theater of 
operations. (Concept for Container Movement Using AIT: p. 4, 4 
November 19 94) This occurrence is contrary to the goals of 
unitization. 
Since the trend is toward unitization, the 2 0 foot 
container is ideally suited to this purpose. The 40 foot 
container under this concept would likely be suboptimized, 
wasting valuable cargo space that could be taken up by smaller 
20 foot containers. Therefore, the 40 foot container does not 
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appear to be compatible with the unitization goals on a 
company or battalion level scale. (Fox, Interview, 1995) 
Additionally, the unitization concept using 20 foot 
containers complies with current Army regulations, which call 
for the 2 0 foot by eight foot by eight foot container to be 
the Army standard container for unit equipment shipments. 
However, the regulation does allow for the use of larger 
containers in contingency or mobilization operations. (Army 
Regulation 56-4:  1990) 
b.     Army Strategic Mobility Plan 
In addition to the areas discussed above, the 
military has been revising container doctrine to reflect the 
mobility requirements as well as budgetary and manpower 
constraints. Part of that doctrine attempts to define the 
role of the 40 foot container in deployment operations. The 
Army Strategic Mobility Plan is attempting to make the 20 foot 
container the Army standard in transportation movements. 
(DCSLOG, Information Brief:  6 April 1994) 
The apparent dichotomy in the direction the military 
and civilian communities are traveling means that further 
planning must be undertaken regarding the role of the 40 foot 
container. One option posed was that the Army consider 
purchasing 2 0 foot containers and keeping them at a central 
point for units to draw when needed. (Pittman, Interview, 
1995) However, this will probably not eliminate the 40 foot 
container in military transportation operations. According to 
COL Ebertowski, "The 40 foot container is becoming the 
standard in the industry. Buying 2 0 foot containers can't 
close them out." (Ebertowski, Interview, 1995) 
8.  Container Purchase 
Under the Army Strategic Mobility Plan, Military Traffic 
Management Command (MTMC) will purchase containers for use by 
military units based upon validated requirements under 
contingency operations. (Gipson, Interview, 1995) 
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During the latest deployment to Southwest Asia, named 
Operation Vigilant Warrior, the 24th Infantry Division needed 
125 20 foot containers for their initial force movement. The 
division purchased the containers from commercial vendors. 
However, because of the short lead time, containers were 
purchased at a premium price. Additionally, some of the 
containers were in less than peak condition. As a result, the 
division had to pay for the repair of some containers in order 
to deploy. (Driver, Interview, 1995) 
Again, it is worthwhile to note that all containers 
purchased were 2 0 feet in length. However, once in theater, 
the unit began seeing 40 foot containers as resupply items 
were shipped. Thus, the 40 foot container was a factor in the 
operation. (Driver, Interview, 1995) 
9.  Containerization In Haiti 
As events in Haiti and Southwest Asia demonstrate, the 
container shipping problem has still not been completely 
resolved. Lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm are being applied, but the process is not 
complete. 
In the movement of containers to Haiti, units moved 
containers down to the company level. Based upon the mission 
requirements, some containers were not opened for weeks at a 
time. The containers, therefore, became storage areas for 
unit equipment. (Schoen, Interview, 1995) 
The container of choice for these movements was the 2 0 
foot container. In fact, the 2 0 foot container was used 
almost exclusively until commercial vendor supplies began 
diminishing. An additional factor contributing to the 
eventual use of 40 foot containers was the workload on the 
civilian shippers having to effectively double their handling 
tasks by moving the 2 0 foot instead of the 40 foot container. 
These factors were the key elements impacting the decision to 
begin using 40 foot containers. (Schoen, Interview, 1995) 
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B.  CONTAINER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
Cargo and equipment moved by transportation units in a 
theater of operations is governed by the cargo distribution 
system.  The distribution system is defined as: 
...that complex of facilities, installations, 
methods, and procedures designed to receive, store, 
maintain, distribute and control the flow of 
military materiel between the point of receipt into 
the military system and the point of issue to using 
activities and units. (JCS Pub 1-02, 1989) 
The movement of containers impacts all areas of this 
system. However, current doctrine does not provide a 
description of container management and distribution. (Concept 
for Container Distribution: 1994) Containers must be moved as 
far forward in the theater as possible to take advantage of 
the cargo handling and transportation efficiencies they 
provide. (Ebertowski: p.10) Ideally, the container would be 
moved to the final destination before being removed from the 
truck and unloaded. (Gipson, Interview, 1995) However, the 
process of container shipment varies according to whether the 
equipment is organic to the unit or a general resupply 
container. 
1.  Organic Unit Equipment 
Organic unit equipment is that equipment which deploys 
with the unit from their home station to the area of 
operations.  It may include vehicles as well as supplies. 
Based upon the author's personal experience, 
containerized organic unit equipment was moved during 
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm to the division 
level, as requested by unit commanders. The battlefield 
location of many of these containers was the Forward Assembly 
Area (FAA) at the Division Support Command (DISCOM), the 
location occupied prior to assuming final attack positions for 
the  assault  into  Iraq  and  Kuwait.    However,  little 
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consideration was given to how the containers would be 
handled at such forward locations. The current distribution 
system did not adequately address this aspect of container 
operations, and a subsequent shortage of material handling 
assets existed. It then became a hunt throughout the area for 
any available container handler that could be used for moving 
and consolidating containers. 
Twenty foot containers were sometimes downloaded with the 
M88 tracked vehicle heavy tank retrievers found in heavy 
divisions, using chains for slings. However, the 40 foot 
containers were too large to safely attempt handling with the 
M88. To solve the 40 foot container movement dilemma, a Rough 
Terrain Container Handler (RTCH) was borrowed from any unit 
who would release one to perform the container movement 
mission. Clearly, this was not the routine method of 
obtaining container handling support. However, the Corps 
Movement Control Center and Movement Control Teams did not 
have sufficient assets to allocate handlers to each requesting 
division.  As LTG Pagonis stated: 
We need improvement in two general areas: first, 
in the category of rear area equipment, which can 
be solved with buying or renting commercial 
equipment; and second, in the category of rough- 
terrain, forward equipment, which is more 
specialized, isn't normally available in the host 
nation civilian economy, and must therefore be 
brought into the theater by the armed forces. 
(Pagonis:  p.205) 
2.  General Resupply 
Equipment classified as general resupply includes repair 
parts, food, and other classes of supply. These items are 
usually designated for specific units, but the units did not 
bring the items with them. 
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Current distribution doctrine only flows containers 
to the Theater Storage Area (TSA) and the Corps 
Storage Area (CSA), where contents are unstuffed, 
sorted, repackaged and moved to the using unit. 
(Ebertowski:  p.11) 
Based again upon the author's experience during 
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the equivalent 
location was the logistics base in the Corps or Echelons Above 
Corps (EAC) area. From there, depending on the type of 
material, the contents were either sent to the units at the 
division level or the units came to pick up their supplies at 
the logistics bases. For divisional units, the drive to a 
logbase in order to retrieve their supplies could be as long 
as six hours one way. This aspect of operations made 
retrieving supplies relatively inefficient for the unit 
commanders. 
C.  FORCE MODERNIZATION TRENDS 
The issues raised in the background sections above are 
largely tied to a shortage of material handling equipment to 
process containers through the distribution system. Much of 
this can be traced to the philosophies developed since 1983 
regarding Combat Service Support (CSS) operations in general 
and container operations specifically. 
In 1983, the Army developed a force structure 
called The Army of Excellence which resulted in a 
very lean CSS force structure. The Logistics Unit 
Productivity System (LUPS) program supported this 
restructuring and 2 9,000 CSS personnel spaces were 
traded off for 762 million dollars of equipment 
which was to enable the CSS units to increase their 
productivity with less people. The problem is that 
in most cases, the new equipment was not bought and 
the personnel spaces taken out were not replaced. 
(Ebertowski:  p. 22) 
In reviewing the LUPS program, GAO found that, as 
of February 1990, about half of the 390 logistics 
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units in the LUPS program were considerably short 
equipment and manpower. In February 19 90, the Army 
reviewed the personnel and equipment status of the 
LUPS units and found that 138 of the 239 units 
reviewed were too short equipment and or personnel 
to achieve the minimum "C-3" readiness rating. 
(Ebertowski: p. 22) 
The equipment and personnel shortages noted above, along 
with the changing world scenario, led the military to explore 
new ways of accomplishing the transportation mission. An 
important part of this mission refinement involved the aspect 
of shipping containers to forward deployed units. In this 
context, forward deployed units refers to units within the 
tactical level of war. A description of the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels of war will assist in 
illustrating the magnitude of the issues involved. 
1. Strategic Level of War 
The strategic level of war is defined as: 
The level of war at which a nation or group of 
nations determines national or alliance security 
objectives and develops and uses national resources 
to accomplish those objectives. Activities at this 
level establish national and alliance military 
objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and 
assess risks for the use of military and other 
instruments of power; develop global or theater war 
plans to achieve those objectives; and provide 
armed forces and other capabilities in accordance 
with the strategic plan.  (AFSC Pub 1:  p. 1-38) 
2. Operational Level of War 
The operational level of war is defined as: 
The level of war at which campaigns and major 
operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to 
accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or 
areas of operations. Activities at this level link 
tactics and strategy by establishing operational 
objectives needed to accomplish the strategic 
objectives, sequencing events to achieve the 
operational objectives,  initiating actions,  and 
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applying resources to bring about and sustain these 
events. These activities imply a broader dimension 
of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the 
logistics and administrative support of tactical 
forces, and provide the means by which tactical 
successes are exploited to achieve strategic 
objectives. (AFSC Pub 1:  p. 1-32) 
For the purpose of discussion, we will use Operations 
Desert Shield and Desert Storm as an illustration of the 
operational level of war. In this case, the theater in the 
Middle East may be considered the operational level, with the 
sea ports of debarkation being included in this level of war 
as well. Additionally, many of the logistics bases would fall 
into the operational category, since they were above the Corps 
level in their organization. 
3.  Tactical Level of War 
The majority of this thesis will focus upon the tactical 
level of war.  The tactical level of war is defined as: 
The level of war at which battles and engagements 
are planned and executed to accomplish military 
objectives assigned to tactical units or task 
forces. Activities at this level focus on the 
ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements 
in relation to each other and to the enemy to 
achieve combat objectives. (AFSC Pub 1:  pg. 1-41) 
At the tactical level, the largest element is the Army 
Corps.  As summarized in Field Manual 100-5: 
Corps are the Army's largest tactical units, the 
instruments with which higher echelons of command 
conduct maneuver at the operational level...they 
contain all the organic combat, combat support, and 
combat service support capabilities required to 
sustain operations for a considerable period. (U.S. 
Army Field Manual 100-5:  p. 185) 
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4.  Container Handling Equipment 
Few units below the Echelons Above Corps (EAC) level are 
authorized the Rough Terrain Container Handler (RTCH). As a 
result, many of the efficiencies gained from container 
transport were lost during Operations Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm by having to open containers at the port of debarkation 
and send the contents forward to the Supply Support Activities 
(SSAs).   (Ebertowski:  p. 38) 
This shortage of material handling equipment below the 
Corps level is still prevalent today. When discussing the 
capability to receive and use 40 foot containers in forward 
locations, commanders of division level main support 
battalions do not have a problem solely in receiving the 
containers. Rather, the shortfall is primarily in the lack of 
material handling equipment required to unload and load 
containers at the support battalion level. A proposed 
solution was to place the rough terrain container handler at 
locations where forklifts are currently authorized in order to 
allow the handling of containers. Without the capability to 
offload and load the containers, there is little to no benefit 
in shipping the containers to forward locations. (Boles, 
Interview, 1995) 
The difficulty with the position proposed above is the 
fact that divisions are required to be inherently mobile. 
Even the heavy division is required to move quickly and be 
able to perform any tactical mission assigned. (FM 100-5: p. 
185) The RTCH is not easily transportable, so it is difficult 
to move. As a result, the division may become too heavy and 
sacrifice mobility. (Ebertowski, Interview, 1995) 
Additionally, it is doubtful that the Army would spend the 
funds necessary to place a RTCH with all of the support and 
maintenance personnel at each division to accomplish this 
mission. 
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Such an option may be monetarily infeasible, but the Army 
is proposing a force structure modernization under the 
container distribution system which, among other things, would 
create a new Cargo Transfer Company to help offset this 
shortage. 
5.  Cargo Transfer Company 
As stated above, the Cargo Transfer Company (CTC) is a 
proposed force modification that would allow for a more 
flexible response in handling containers at the corps level 
and below. A summary of the capabilities of the CTC is now 
discussed. 
The CTC will replace the current Terminal Service Company 
(Breakbulk), Terminal Service Company (Container/Breakbulk), 
and the current Cargo Transfer Company, providing increased 
flexibility in handling the types of cargo now seen in the 
military. (Draft Cargo Transfer Company URS:  1994) 
The mission capabilities are chiefly expanded to 
incorporate more container handling capabilities while 
slightly reducing the number of personnel required in the 
company. This initiative is similar in concept to the LUPS 
program only in the aspect of increased equipment and slightly 
decreased personnel. The major equipment change is the 
generated requirement for an additional 79 RTCHs Army wide. 
(Gipson, Interview, 1995) 
The missions performed and a suggested scenario of 
employment of the CTC is outlined as follows: 
Under the Army Strategic Mobility Plan, these units 
and the Port Operations Cargo Detachments will have 
equipment prepositioned and will deploy between C+4 
and C+10 to begin discharge of units and supplies. 
At the seaport four of the companies and all of the 
detachments will initially discharge the ships that 
have been prepositioned. (Draft URS: 1994) 
As the operation develops into the sustainment 
phase and theater development, cargo handling 
operations at the SPODs will be assumed by either 
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follow-on units or contract support/Host Nation 
support under MTMC. The cargo handling companies 
will then be available to corps and division units 
requiring additional CHE/MHE to meet surge 
requirements. Units originally assigned to theater 
may be reassigned to the corps during this 
transition. (Draft URS:  1994) 
An element of note is the plan to initially provide the 
CTC at EAC level only. Only after the theater is more 
developed would the CTC assets be available to levels below 
EAC for missions. This support, based upon the discussions 
above, would more than likely be in a general support (GS) 
role for units below the corps level. In other words, a 
particular division would not receive a RTCH on a permanent 
basis, but only as needed and based upon the priorities of the 
corps. This aspect is significant when discussing the 
handling of 40 foot containers, since the division will still 
not have organic equipment it can count upon with certainty to 
offload and move containers. 
In summary, the CTC proposals should help alleviate the 
problems previously experienced at the division level. 
However, there is still enough uncertainty about container 
handling capabilities to cause concern at levels below EAC on 
where to send the 40 foot container. 
6.  Palletized Load System 
The Palletized Load System (PLS) was designed initially 
to move ammunition pallets around the battlefield. The system 
consists of a pallet or flatrack that can be dismounted from 
a truck chassis, loaded with equipment, and then retrieved by 
the truck for movement to other destinations. It was designed 
as a cross country vehicle with excellent mobility 
characteristics. The current PLS trucks are configured either 
with or without mounted cranes. Those trucks without mounted 
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cranes cannot pick up pallets organically; they must have 
material handling support to lift the pallets. (Price, 
Interview, 1995) 
Current efforts are underway to modify the PLS truck to 
handle containers. The PLS truck with a flatrack can carry a 
20 foot container, but the gross weight of the container and 
cargo is approximately 16 short tons. This limitation is due 
to the fact that the flatrack must be used in conjunction with 
the container. The result is a diminished cargo capacity. 
Furthermore, the system would require equipment at origin and 
destination to handle the container. (Price, Interview, 1995) 
A more significant negative factor regarding the PLS 
truck for container operations, however, is the fact that it 
cannot carry a container as currently configured and meet the 
height restrictions of many overseas countries. In effect, 
the mobility is constricted by height restrictions under 
overpasses. (Price, Interview, 1995) 
Regarding the use of PLS for transporting 40 foot 
containers, the current system does not have that capability. 
Research and feasibility studies are underway to ascertain the 
possibility of such a modification, but initial prospects are 
unclear as to whether modifications can be made on such a 
large scale. (Price, Interview, 1995) 
7.  Self Loading/Unloading Trailer 
A development on the horizon in the transportation 
industry is the development of a self-loading and unloading 
semitrailer. This trailer would be able to drop off and pick 
up containers anywhere in the theater of operations with no 
external support required. The key aspect of this trailer 
would be the fact that no external material handling equipment 
would be required to load or unload containers. If fielded, 
this system would greatly reduce the manpower and equipment 
requirements for handling containers in any contingency- A 
proposed fielding would occur incrementally, with the new 
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trailers gradually replacing older semi-trailers in the Army 
inventory. The mission needs statement has been approved to 
begin the acquisition process, and feasibility studies are 
underway. (Price, Interview, 19 95) 
8.  Equipment Prepositioning 
Current military doctrine as espoused under "Force XXI" 
states that: 
America's strategic mobility capabilities are 
hinged on a critical triad consisting of equipment 
pre-positioning, strategic sealift, and airlift, 
supported by world-class power projection 
installations. The first leg of the triad is pre- 
positioning. (Army Focus '94:  p. 29) 
The value of prepositioning equipment and supplies was 
discussed in a Government Accounting Office report on 
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: 
During Operation Desert Shield, the availability of 
U.S. prepositioned assets proved important. These 
assets included material-handling and 
transportation equipment stored aboard U.S. ships 
and at land sites in the Middle East. (GAO/NSIAD- 
92-20:  p.3) 
As noted previously, the CTC is envisioned as arriving in 
theater between C+4 and C+10 using pre-positioned equipment. 
Therefore, the pre-positioning of equipment is worthy of note. 
The eventual goal of the pre-positioning program is to be able 
to field over four divisions of equipment from pre-positioned 
stocks. (Ebertowski, Interview, 1995) 
Part of this program is the aspect of pre-positioning 
container ships with supplies, ammunition, and other items 
needed for rapid response to a theater of operations. 
Currently, the containerships Titus and Gibson are preparing 
to load containers for pre-positioning in Diego Garcia. Both 
ships will have full complements of containers. However, all 
containers scheduled for pre-positioning are 20 feet in 
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length, with no provisions for 40 foot containers. 
(Ebertowski, Interview, 1995) This reflects the Army position 
discussed earlier of attempting to limit container use to 20 
foot lengths only. 
D.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In summary, the Army has lagged behind civilian industry 
in their use of containerization as a transportation asset. 
Additionally, the military and commercial sectors appear to be 
charting divergent courses, with the commercial industry 
moving toward 40 foot containers as an industry standard while 
the Army is attempting to establish the 20 foot container as 
the transportation standard. 
Even with Army efforts to establish a 20 foot container 
standard, the 40 foot container has nevertheless played a 
significant role in recent deployments to various locations. 
History has demonstrated that the 40 foot container is 
probably going to be a part of transportation operations in 
any future contingency. 
Current force modernization trends are attempting to 
grapple with the fact that 40 foot containers are an integral 
part of the transportation system. The research into PLS 
modifications as well as the initiative in developing a self- 
loading and unloading semi-trailer demonstrate the Army's 
recognition that 40 foot containers will be employed in future 
operations. The proposed Cargo Transfer Company also 
demonstrates the Army's commitment to providing container 
handling support to lower echelons of command. 
Equally obvious is the difficulty in determining where on 
the field of battle to send the 40 foot container. The 
military has made great strides in tracking containers, but 
dealing with information about cargo is easier than dealing 
with the cargo itself. (Reengineering the Defense 
Transportation System: p.15)  Customers want the containers, 
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but only if it is possible to handle them. Containers have 
traveled from the port to the company level, and all points in 
between. Therefore, a dilemma exists regarding the employment 
of 40 foot containers within the theater of operations. 
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III.  MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A.  CRITERIA 
Based upon the information previously presented, the 
ground commander and transportation agencies must have a set 
of clearly defined options from which to choose in determining 
the proper location for shipment of 40 foot containers. In 
developing a list of options available, several criteria 
emerged which must be considered.  These are: 
• Service to the customer. 
• Force level requirements for transportation assets. 
• Effect upon road network congestion. 
• Efficiency of material handling operations. 
• Optimization of the container capacity. 
1.  Service to the Customer 
Since transportation operations are usually classified as 
service operations in nature, this element is an important 
criterion when examining possible courses of action for 
shipment of the 40 foot container. An integral aspect of good 
customer service is providing service which allows the 
customer to remain capable of accomplishing his assigned 
missions. The transportation of equipment and supplies should 
not adversely affect this ability and, if possible, should 
enhance the customer's ability to perform assigned tasks 
effectively. Therefore, customer service for the purpose of 
this thesis will be defined by the author as the ability of 
the transportation agency to satisfy customer demands for 
movement of supplies and equipment to various locations in the 
theater of operations. 
In this context, customer service includes the delivery 
of equipment or supplies on time in a location accessible and 
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desirable to the customer. Furthermore, it includes the 
flexibility to move where and when the customer desires. In 
summary, customer service for this analysis can be viewed as 
the ease of access by the using unit to supplies and 
equipment. 
Customer service is also a function of equipment required 
for handling containers. However, for this analysis, customer 
service will be isolated as a criterion for measurement, with 
force level requirements addressed separately. 
2. Force Level Requirements 
Force level requirements refer to the physical assets 
needed for accomplishing the container movement mission. This 
includes personnel as well as equipment requirements. The 
force level element is the other important criterion of this 
analysis, since some level of force structure is required to 
support any alternative proposed. 
A sub-element of the force structure aspect is the 
requirement that any assets needed to accomplish each proposed 
alternative are either available now in the Army inventory or 
are planned for implementation as discussed in Chapter II of 
this thesis. Differences between currently fielded equipment 
and proposed future developments will be factored into the 
analysis as warranted. 
3. Congestion on Road Networks 
The main factors of this criterion are vehicle density on 
a particular route and the ability of the route to handle such 
densities. In general, the effect upon road congestion must 
be weighed to determine whether the proposed level of shipment 
of containers is possible over the existing road network. 
This area is partially tied to the equipment requirements, 
since certain types of trucks may be needed for forward 
movement of 40 foot containers. The road network must be 
sufficient to accommodate these vehicles in order for an 
option to be feasibly considered. For this analysis, however, 
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the equipment discussion will be isolated initially from any 
road congestion issues. 
A further area of consideration is the effect, if any, of 
increased transportation traffic on the maneuver units in the 
area. Clearly, any adverse effect upon the mobility of 
maneuver units due to road congestion must be included in the 
consideration of alternatives. 
4. Efficiency of Material Handling Operations 
The efficiency of material handling operations refers to 
the use of available resources in such a way as to achieve the 
most benefit from the least expenditure of either machinery or 
personnel. A consideration involving the machinery aspect is 
whether a sufficient workload exists to justify placement of 
material handling equipment (MHE) at proposed locations to 
support the options available for implementation. 
The idle time of MHE at one location may be viewed 
economically as lost productivity of the MHE if it were to 
operate at some other location. This factor is referred to as 
the opportunity cost of keeping the machinery at a particular 
site. (Pindyck and Rubinfeld: p. 198) Ideally, the 
opportunity cost of idle equipment should be kept as low as 
possible. Therefore, the efficiency of material handling 
operations criterion will, in large measure, weigh the 
opportunity cost of having the equipment at the specified 
location to support a particular option. 
5. Optimization of the Container Capacity 
This criterion will address the aspect of fully loaded 
containers. As discussed previously, a developing doctrine is 
the concept of unitization, where all items needed for a 
particular unit are placed in one container. At some level of 
organization, the 40 foot container will be sub-optimized, or 
less than fully loaded. Transportation operations are more 
efficient when all available container space is filled and 
containers are stuffed to capacity.  Therefore, the topic of 
29 
container optimization in the context of load capacity is 
relevant to a discussion of the proper shipping location of 40 
foot containers. 
B.  TYPES OF MOVEMENT 
In addition to the criteria listed above, the category of 
movement must be addressed as well. As stated in previous 
chapters, this thesis will address the movement of organic 
unit supplies and equipment under surge deployments, the 
initial surge of general supplies into the theater, and 
finally the sustainment shipment of supplies and equipment 
into the mature theater of operations. 
1.  Organic Unit Movement 
This category will include all containerized equipment or 
supplies that move with the unit when deploying to a 
contingency theater of. operations. Traditionally, Army 
doctrine and unit commanders have tried to move the unit as a 
single entity whenever possible, maximizing unit integrity 
during deployments/redeployments. (AR 56-4: p. 6) As stated 
by Green: 
Unit commanders are especially concerned about the 
ability to have their unit arrive at the Port of 
Debarkation (POD) relatively intact. They are also 
extremely concerned with intransit visibility of 
their equipment. Breaking units apart into several 
elements and the resultant loss of control, coupled 
with poor visibility of these shipments, is 
naturally stressful to the commander. Acting upon 
these concerns, unit commanders may pressure 
transportation providers to tailor the deployment 
around the unit, in order to ensure it arrives 
intact and before other units.  (Green:  p.26) 
Clearly, this type of movement has inherent challenges to 
overcome that other types of movement do not necessarily need 
to address. For this purpose, organic unit containers will be 
addressed as a specific type of movement. 
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2. Initial Surge of General Supplies 
Once units begin initial deployments into a theater of 
operations, cargo will be pushed to the theater in rapid 
fashion to build up supplies as needed by ground commanders. 
This can lead to a difficult period of trying to establish 
structures to cope with the amounts of supplies and equipment 
arriving in theater.  As stated by Pagonis: 
In the midst of on-again, off-again chaos, we stuck 
doggedly to our basic, three-phase structure: 
reception, onward movement, and sustainment...The 
situation was simply too overwhelming to grasp 
fully and to structure in those early weeks. 
(Pagonis:  p.95) 
As noted, the specific issue pertaining to surge 
shipments of general cargo is the capability on the ground in 
theater for processing the large initial volume of containers. 
This aspect poses a different set of logistical problems for 
the transportation agency attempting to move supplies. 
3. Sustainment Shipments to a Developed Theater 
As more units and equipment arrive in a theater of 
operations, an infrastructure can be organized to provide 
support for the theater. In such a developed theater, the 
resupply and sustainment mission receives the logistical 
emphasis. (FM 100-5:  p.64) 
To facilitate this phase of an operation, units must 
receive a multitude of items, including spare parts and 
equipment. Most of this resupply arrives by container since 
food, fuels and ammunition are 100 percent containerizable, 
repair parts 80 percent containerizable, and barrier material 
75 percent containerizable.  (Ebertowski:  p.18) 
Since such a large amount of material is container 
compatible, this movement type must be addressed in the 
discussion of shipping the 40 foot container. 
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C.  MEASUREMENT METHOD 
In analyzing the various courses of action using the 
criteria and movement types expressed above, some form of 
measurement must be used to differentiate between 
alternatives. This thesis will use a numeric value scale and 
weighted decision matrices to determine the best courses of 
action for each of the three proposed movement types. This 
method is modeled on the decision matrix format, with criteria 
and courses of action assigned numbers based upon comparison 
to a defined scale. 
The scale will be a numeric representation from one to 
five, with definitions assigned for numbers one, three and 
five. A rating of five for a particular area will denote a 
highly favorable impact of the criterion on the course of 
action represented. Conversely, a rating of one will denote 
a highly unfavorable impact of the criterion on the course of 
action. Finally, a rating of three will denote a marginal 
impact of the criterion on the course of action. In short, 
higher numbers reflect more desirable options. 
The numbers assigned as described above will be 
incorporated into a weighted value decision matrix for the 
purpose of evaluating various courses of action for moving 40 
foot containers. The software used for matrix analysis is the 
Military Applications Program Package from the Combined Arms 
and Services Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October 
1990. The criteria used in each scenario of movement will be 
the five discussed previously. The following weights will be 
assigned to each criterion in the analysis: 
• Customer service:  weight of four. 
• Force structure:  weight of three. 
• Container optimization:  weight of two. 
• Material handling efficiency:  weight of two. 
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• Road congestion:  weight of one. 
Table 1 is a sample of the table which will be used in 
the analysis process. Each of the empty cells in the matrix 
will be filled with a number from one to five, based upon the 
effect of that criterion upon the particular course of action. 
crltaria\ 
Coursa of 













Note a "*" will denote the best course of action 
Table 1 Sample Decision Matrix Table 
1.  Customer Service 
As stated previously, the mission of transportation is to 
provide a service to the customer. As a result, this area is 
the most important criterion to consider when discussing 
courses of action, and thus warrants a weighting of four. 
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2 .  Force Level Requirements 
Force level requirements are the second most important 
elements to consider when analyzing courses of action. As 
stated earlier, containers cannot be moved without required 
equipment to handle them in forward locations. 
3. Container Optimization 
The attempted trend of the Army toward unitization along 
with vessel efficiencies discussed earlier dictate an 
additional weighting of this criterion as well. Less than 
fully loaded containers do not enhance the overall 
transportation operation, and are inefficient for large scale 
operations. 
4. Material Handling Efficiency 
As stated earlier, the opportunity cost of MHE at forward 
locations must be considered. Since MHE is a critical 
shortage, its use must be watched carefully for waste and idle 
time. Time spent idle in the forward areas is time not spent 
moving containers in rear areas. Thus, this criterion must be 
weighted as a factor of two. 
5. Road Congestion 
Road congestion, while significant, is not so critical as 
to warrant significant additional weighting in this model. 
The author's experiences in Operations Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm proved that roads can be built if needed to 
alleviate road congestion, as occurred in Saudi Arabia. 
Therefore, a factor of one is appropriate for this criterion. 
D.  PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION 
Based upon the information previously presented and the 
criteria developed, four options appear as the most likely 
alternatives to the problem of how far forward to ship a 40 
foot container.  They are: 
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• Unload the containers at the SPOD. 
• Ship the containers to EAC level. 
• Ship the containers to corps level. 
• Ship the containers to division level. 
The option of shipping 40 foot containers below the 
division level does not seem feasible in light of discussions 
presented earlier regarding the difficulties encountered at 
levels below the division. Therefore, this option is not 
included in the analysis and is dismissed as infeasible in 
light of current and future military trends. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  SURGE OF ORGANIC UNIT EQUIPMENT 
Under this scenario, units will deploy with their 
equipment and containers, packing the containers at the origin 
with items needed for operations in theater. The equipment is 
presumed to be needed by the units upon arrival in theater or 
shortly thereafter. Table 2 shows the results of the analysis 
of courses of action in numeric form, using weights and values 
generated by the author. As delineated in the table, the best 
course of action during the surge of organic unit equipment is 
to ship 40 foot containers only as far as the EAC level. An 
analysis of the different courses of action and the rationale 
for assignment of values now follows. 
criteria\ 
Coursa of 
Action Weight SPOD EAC Corps Division 
Customer 
Service 
4 1 2 3 5 
Force 
Structure 
3 5 5 2 1 
Container 
Optimization 
2 5 5 4 1 
MHE 
Efficiency 
2 5 5 3 2 
Congestion 1 5 4 3 2 
Totals 44 47* 35 31 
Note:  "*" denotes best course of action 
Table 2  Surge Movement of Organic Unit Equipment 
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1.  Unload Containers at the SPOD 
This option would send 40 foot containers as far as the 
SPOD, where they would be unloaded, emptied, and returned to 
the carrier for retrograde operations. The equipment or cargo 
in the containers would be loaded into smaller containers or 
on some other mode of transport for further shipment to the 
final destination. The tradeoffs of this course of action are 
now discussed in the context of the criteria shown in Table 2. 
a.  Customer Service 
Customer service under this course of action would 
be adversely affected by shipping the containers only as far 
as the SPOD. The customer does not receive his supplies or 
equipment in a timely fashion in a suitable location. 
Furthermore, the flexibility to deliver or move the cargo to 
forward locations is greatly diminished. This course of 
action has the most adverse effect upon customer service of 
any courses of action under this scenario. Since the effect 
on customer service is such an adverse effect, a poor rating 
of one is appropriate for this criterion. 
Jb. Force Structure 
As noted in Chapter II, the force structure to 
process equipment and containers in this phase is located at 
the ports with host nation equipment or is facilitated by the 
arrival of the CTC units to conduct ship offloading and 
container movement. Since the CTCs will be able to process 
containers at the port in the times required, this criterion 
is affected positively by the course of action presented. 
Therefore, a rating of five is appropriate in this case. 
c.     Container Optimization 
Under this course of action, containers would be 
unstuffed at the SPOD and returned to the carrier for other 
operations. In the case of military owned containers, the 40 
foot boxes would be available to return to CONUS rapidly, 
minimizing turnaround time.   Transit time of the empty 
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container would be reduced to the shortest possible time of 
any course of action. Therefore, the container would make 
more trips, hauling more cargo in the long run. For these 
reasons, a rating of five is appropriate for this criterion. 
d. MHE Efficiency 
The use of MHE in theater will be optimized by 
keeping the equipment busy during operations. The SPOD is the 
best place to keep MHE continuously processing containers, 
since the requirement exists to load and unload containers 
from ships and transload to other transportation modes. Since 
keeping MHE in the SPOD is the most efficient use of the 
equipment under this scenario, a rating of five is warranted. 
e. Congestion 
The effect of shipping containers to the SPOD upon 
road network congestion is minimal in a direct sense. However, 
indirectly, the unloading of containers at such a rear 
location could cause traffic bottlenecks as less efficient 
transportation methods are used to move the cargo and 
equipment further forward. These bottlenecks could impede the 
flow of maneuver unit traffic at some point. In all 
likelihood, the bottlenecks will be generally in a more rear 
location than forward when looking at the whole theater. 
Because of the minimal impact upon forward units, a rating of 
five is warranted. 
f. Summary 
The option of shipping containers to the SPOD keeps 
container empty time to a minimum. It also facilitates the 
best use of MHE that is providing support for ship unloading 
operations. The force structure needed for this option is 
either fully in place or under development. Furthermore, the 
road networks may not be congested in forward locations. 
However, the potential exists for congestion by less efficient 
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transport vehicles. Finally, and most importantly, this 
course of action does not provide a high level of customer 
service. 
2. Ship Containers to Echelons Above Corps 
Under this course of action, 40 foot containers would be 
shipped to EAC locations, emptied and returned to the shipper 
or the SPOD for future operations. The cargo would be 
transloaded to other vehicles for shipment to the final unit, 
or the customer would be notified to go pick up the equipment 
or cargo. Based upon the author's experience in Operations 
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the latter possibility could 
occur under this course of action. 
a. Customer Service 
Under the EAC option, customer service is slightly 
improved over the option of unloading containers at the SPOD. 
Units still do not have the containers in desired locations 
when they want them, and they lose an element of flexibility 
for future operations. Therefore, a rating of two is 
appropriate. 
b. Force Structure 
Again, the force structure is fully in place at EAC 
level to handle containers in the EAC area, since the EAC 
commanders will control the CTCs as discussed in Chapter II. 
Therefore, a rating of five is appropriate here as it was for 
the previous course of action. 
c. Container Optimization 
Containers under this option can be quickly turned 
around with minimal time in transit as empty containers. 
Furthermore, the containers at this level are still certain to 
be filled completely, with no wasted space. For these 
reasons, a rating of five is given. 
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d. MHE Efficiency 
As noted earlier, the control of MHE during this 
scenario rests with the EAC commanders. Therefore, the CTCs 
and all other MHE will be at the EAC level for maximum 
utilization. Since the volume of containers arriving in the 
EAC area will still be large as demonstrated in Chapter III, 
there will be sufficient workload to keep all MHE continuously 
operating with minimal travel time between loading locations. 
Therefore, a rating of five is warranted. 
e. Congestion 
As stated in the previous course of action, the 
effect on road congestion in the EAC area is relatively 
minimal as it impacts upon final destination units. However, 
the possibility does exist for congestion due to the secondary 
effects of more vehicles using the road network with less 
efficient methods of transport. These effects will be more 
pronounced than at the SPOD level. As such, a rating of four 
is appropriate. 
f. Summary 
This option provides many of the same benefits as 
the course of action outlining shipping containers to the 
SPOD. The biggest improvements are in the area of customer 
service, where the customer gets the containers closer to his 
final destination. The force structure still exists to 
provide such service, and this option makes excellent use of 
available MHE. However, there is still some limitation of the 
flexibility of units to move with 40 foot containers shipped 
to the EAC level. 
3.  Ship Containers to the Corps 
Under this course of action, the containers would be 
shipped down to corps level, where they would be unstuffed and 
then returned to the system for use in further operations. 
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a. Customer Service 
When shipping 40 foot containers to the corps level, 
customers receive their equipment closer to the final 
destination than either of the two previous courses of action. 
However, the contents of the container must still be 
transported by other means to the final unit destinations. 
Because the unit commander does not have complete flexibility 
under this course of action, a rating of three is appropriate. 
b. Force Structure 
At the corps level, a noticeable lack of force 
structure exists during this scenario. As stated in Chapter 
II and previously under other courses of action, the CTCs will 
be under EAC control offloading ships arriving in theater 
until the arrival of follow-on forces. As follow-on forces 
arrive, the CTCs will be tasked to the corps for support of 
corps MHE functions. During the initial surge of unit 
equipment, it is highly unlikely that the corps will receive 
sufficient assets to successfully accomplish the 40 foot 
container movement missions. Therefore, a rating of two is 
warranted. 
c. Container Optimization 
As in previous courses of action, 40 foot containers 
will be stuffed full with no wasted space at the corps level. 
It is also likely that, while not as quick as previous 
options, the containers will be turned around fairly quickly. 
The minor degradation in turnaround time justifies a rating of 
four in this case. 
d. MHE Efficiency 
At the corps level, the possibility exists that MHE 
will be required to move to various locations in the theater 
to conduct container movement missions. As containers are 
shipped to lower echelons, the density of containers at a 
particular location diminishes as well. This diminished 
density may result  in the requirement  for MHE to be 
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transported to different locations for container operations. 
When the MHE is being transported, it is not conducting 
container movement operations. Therefore, the MHE may be 
better used in areas where movement of the equipment is 
minimized.  For this reason, a rating of three is warranted. 
e. Congestion 
As the containers are transported to the corps 
level, the number of large trucks carrying 40 foot containers 
increases. These trucks may have difficulty traveling the 
road networks of the corps area. As a result, congestion may 
occur. Furthermore, the appearance of container trucks in the 
corps area naturally brings the road congestion to a higher 
level for maneuver units. At this level, however, the effect 
will still be relatively small. Therefore, a rating of three 
is appropriate. 
f. Summary 
Shipping containers to the corps area increases the 
level of customer service by moving the cargo and equipment 
closer to the final destination. However, the major drawback 
is the fact that MHE may not be available in sufficient 
quantities to move the containers as they arrive. 
Furthermore, the container handlers will be less efficient 
because of the increased transit requirements. These 
drawbacks may outweigh the benefits of moving 40 foot 
containers to the corps area. 
4.  Ship Containers to the Division 
Under this course of action, the 40 foot containers would 
be moved to division level, where they would be unloaded and 
returned to the system for future missions. 
a. Customer Service 
Clearly, this alternative provides the highest level 
of service from the standpoint of having cargo and equipment 
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on time in a preferred location.  For this reason, a rating of 
five is warranted. 
b. Force Structure 
As noted in the previous example, the CTCs will not 
be available to support movement below EAC in this scenario. 
It is a near certainty that the division will not have MHE 
dedicated for their use in moving 40 foot containers. As a 
result, they will be relegated to obtaining container support 
as outlined in Chapter II, begging anyone who has the 
equipment for some usage time. Due to this nearly total lack 
of handling capability, a rating of one is clearly required. 
c. Container Optimization 
Based upon the author's experience, it is difficult 
to load 40 foot containers to their fullest capacity when 
shipping to the division level. As a result, sub-optimization 
of the container may occur. Similarly, the container will 
take longer to return to the container pool for future actions 
than under any of the other courses of action. For these 
reasons, a rating of one was assigned. 
d. MHE Efficiency 
When there is little or no MHE capable of handling 
40 foot containers in the division area, it is difficult to 
gauge MHE efficiency. The available MHE, if any exists, will 
have a large workload in proportion to the amount of MHE on 
site. However, transit time between sites will still be 
required to place the MHE where it is needed. Therefore, a 
rating of two is appropriate. 
e. Congestion 
When moving 40 foot containers to the division area, 
it is possible that some roads may be difficult if not 
impassable for the trucks to negotiate. Coupled with the 
added number of vehicles on the road hauling containers in the 
maneuver unit area, congestion may be greatly increased over 
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other courses of action presented. Therefore, a rating of two 
is assigned. 
f.     Summary 
The customer service level provided by shipping 40 
foot containers to the division level is the highest among the 
options presented. However, in this scenario, little or no 
MHE will be available to perform the container handling 
mission. Therefore, the gain in customer service is more than 
offset by the inability of the unit to move containers. 
5.  Sensitivity Analysis 
When developing tables with relative values, it is 
sometimes useful to conduct an analysis to determine whether 
changing a parameter will have an effect on the outcome. The 
analysis of parameter changes and their effect on model 
solutions is known as sensitivity analysis. (Taylor: p.145) 
For the purpose of this model, the parameters examined will be 
the weights assigned to each of the criteria as discussed 
previously with the goal of determining the effects, if any, 
on the model solution. In other words, if the criteria 
weights are changed, will the best solution change? 
In this case, using the Military Applications Program 
Package discussed earlier, the model was determined to be 
sensitive in the areas of customer service and congestion. In 
other words, changing the criteria weights one at a time by as 
much as three units in either direction has some effect on the 
best solution. 
Customer service became sensitive at a criterion 
weighting of one, with the best solution being a tie between 
shipping containers to EAC level and unloading them at the 
SPOD. In other words, if customer service was deemed to be no 
more important a criterion than road congestion, then 
containers should be unloaded at the SPOD or at EAC level. 
For this model, however, customer service has been established 
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as the primary consideration of importance. Therefore, the 
model remains valid for this criterion. 
The criterion of road congestion became sensitive at a 
weighting of four, with the best solution again being a tie 
between unloading containers at the SPOD and shipping them to 
EAC level. Therefore, if road congestion was deemed so 
important a criterion that a weighting of four was warranted, 
the best solution would be to either unload containers at the 
SPOD or ship them to EAC levels. For this model, it has been 
established that congestion is not of paramount concern. For 
these reasons, the model solution as presented may be 
considered as valid. 
6.  Scenario Summary 
The best course of action for this scenario is to ship 
the containers no further than the EAC level. The CTCs will 
not be available for use below EAC in this phase, since they 
will be performing port clearance operations. Therefore, the 
units will not have sufficient capability to process the 40 
foot containers. A lack of MHE at lower levels, coupled with 
the initial congestion and surge efforts make movement of the 
40 foot container impractical below this level. 
B.  INITIAL SURGE OF GENERAL SUPPLIES 
This scenario includes items deemed important for initial 
theater buildup and support. Among the items sent during the 
surge of general cargo may be barrier material, clothing 
replacement or augmentation, food, water, and general repair 
parts for common vehicles. Some of this equipment will be 
sent for specific units while other equipment may be sent to 
depots in the EAC area or to a Corps Storage Area (CSA). 
Table 3 shows the results of analyzing the various 
courses of action in numerical form. As noted in the table, 
the best course of action during the surge of general cargo is 




Action Weight SPOD EAC Corps Division 
Customer 
Service 
4 1 3 4 5 
Force 
St ructure 
3 5 5 2 1 
Container 
Opt imizat ion 
2 5 5 4 2 
MHE 
Efficiency 
2 5 5 2 2 
Congest ion 1 5 4 3 2 
Totals 44 51* 37 33 
Note:  "*" denotes best course of action 
Table 3  Surge Movement of General Cargo 
1.  Unload Containers at the SPOD 
This scenario presents the same issues regarding 40 foot 
container movement as the situation presented under the surge 
of organic unit equipment, with the same considerations for 
all criteria. The major difference is the fact that more 
units will be in theater than under the surge of organic unit 
equipment scenario. However, this difference does not warrant 
significant changes for unloading considerations at the SPOD. 
Therefore, the weights are the same in this scenario for this 
course of action as they were for the surge movement of 
organic unit equipment. 
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2. Ship Containers to Echelons Above Corps 
The criterion of customer service in this scenario 
differs significantly when compared with the movement of 
organic unit equipment. All other criteria are not 
significantly different to warrant additional discussion in 
this section. The customer service difference is now 
discussed. 
a. Customer Service 
The key element in this scenario is the fact that 
units will be arriving and setting up for operations, having 
already received their organic equipment. Therefore, shipping 
containers to EAC storage depots brings the supplies closer to 
the final unit than unloading at the SPOD. As discussed in 
Chapter III, the structure will be in the early formation 
stages, with facilities being set up to accommodate such 
equipment. Therefore, the gain from shipping to EAC levels in 
customer service warrants a rating of three. 
b. Summary 
As mentioned previously, other considerations 
regarding shipping containers to EAC levels are not 
significantly different from those mentioned in the previous 
scenario. Therefore, the increase in customer service is the 
primary issue of improvement under this course of action. 
3. Ship Containers to Corps 
The areas of significant difference under this course of 
action pertain to customer service and MHE efficiency. 
a. Customer Service 
Shipping containers to the Corps area provides 
greater benefit to the final unit since the unit will 
presumably have its equipment on hand. Thus, transporting the 
cargo or supplies from corps levels to final units will be 
easier to accomplish. For this reason, a rating of four is 
appropriate. 
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Jb. MHE Efficiency 
As more units arrive and more cargo arrives in 
theater, the requirement for MHE to handle containers will 
naturally rise. In the surge stages of deployment, the CTCs 
will still remain at the EAC levels to provide needed support. 
Therefore, the corps will have the same MHE shortfall 
experienced earlier. When the same assets are spread over a 
much larger demand area and quantity, efficiency will drop 
dramatically.  Therefore, a rating of two is required. 
c.     Summary 
This option provides higher customer service than 
the two previous courses of action presented. However, the 
MHE shortfalls are exacerbated by an increased demand for the 
assets in theater. Therefore, the benefits of shipping 40 
foot containers to corps level may again be offset by a lack 
of MHE to handle the containers. 
4.  Ship Containers to the Division 
This course of action differs significantly from the 
previous scenario in the area of container optimization. All 
other areas of this option are adequately similar to the 
issues discussed under surge movement of organic equipment. 
a.  Container Optimization 
The possibility of filling 40 foot containers to 
capacity is greater in this scenario because the containers 
will be arriving from depot level activities in CONUS. If the 
40 foot container is used, commercial and military depot level 
activities will attempt to fully load the container. 
Therefore, the division is more likely to receive a full 
container than a sub-optimized one. However, the long delay 
in returning containers to the system, coupled with the 
problems noted previously, warrant a small increase in the 
rating assigned.  Thus, a rating of two is given. 
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Jb.  Summary 
The option of shipping 40 foot containers to the 
division level is still fraught with difficulties, as 
expressed earlier. The division will still have the problem 
of handling the containers they receive. 
5. Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis was also conducted for this model. 
In this case, the model was demonstrated to be not sensitive 
to changes in the weights of all criteria. In other words, 
changing the weights as noted previously had no effect on the 
best solution. 
6. Scenario Summary 
The best course of action under this scenario is to ship 
4 0 foot containers no farther than the EAC level. The 
differences in the courses of action are more pronounced in 
this scenario because of the increased workload upon the 
corps, performed with essentially the same MHE on hand. 
Therefore, the corps and division levels will not be able to 
adequately handle 40 foot containers that are shipped to their 
level. 
C.  SDSTAINMENT SHIPMENT OF GENERAL CARGO 
Under this scenario, the theater will be a mature area of 
operations with full support personnel and equipment on hand 
to receive and transport supplies and equipment. This 
situation is fundamentally different from the previous two 
scenarios, and requires separate analysis in most areas. 
Table 4 displays the results of the analysis of courses 
of action under this scenario in numeric form. As noted in 
the table, the best course of action during sustainment 
shipments of general cargo is to ship 40 foot containers to 
the corps level. At the corps level, the containers would be 




Action Weight SPOD EAC Corps Division 
Customer 
Service 
4 1 3 4 5 
Force 
structure 
3 5 4 4 1 
Container 
Optlmizat ion 
2 5 5 4 1 
MHE 
Efficiency 
2 4 4 4 2 
Congest ion 1 5 4 3 2 
Totals 42 46 47* 31 
Note:  "*" denotes best course of action 
Table 4  Sustainment Movement of General Cargo 
1.  Unload Containers at the SPOD 
The general method of operations remains the same as in 
the previous two scenarios presented. However, there are 
significant differences which must be analyzed in this 
particular scenario that are independent of the other 
scenarios previously discussed. 
a.  Customer Service 
The lack of customer service in this course of 
action is more obvious than previously noted, since more 
resources will be in theater to move the cargo forward. This 
aspect will be discussed under force structure. However, for 
the criterion of customer service, a rating of one is 
appropriate. 
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Jb. Force Structure 
Clearly, the force structure will exist in a mature 
theater of operations to unload containers at the SPOD. 
Follow-on forces will have arrived, releasing the CTCs to 
corps levels as needed to provide needed container handling 
support. Because of the theater reaching the maximum 
container handling capability during this scenario, a rating 
of five is appropriate. 
c. Container Optimization 
Similarly, 40 foot containers will be turned around 
rapidly at the SPOD, as in the two previous scenarios. 
Therefore, a rating of five is warranted for this criterion. 
d. MHE Efficiency 
The theater will have a greatly increased container 
handling capability during the sustainment phase of an 
operation. Therefore, there will be more MHE in lower levels 
to accomplish the container movement issue. Because this 
additional capacity is not at the SPOD, the cost of unloading 
containers at the SPOD may be the idle time of MHE at lower 
echelons in the theater. Therefore, a rating of four is 
appropriate. 
e. Congestion 
Congestion at the port will be alleviated somewhat 
by the departure of units to the theater of operations. 
Furthermore, the structure will be in place to clear the port 
more rapidly than under other scenarios. However, the same 
possibility exists of potentially clogging road networks at 
lower echelons with less efficient transport vehicles due to 
the unloading of 40 foot containers at the SPOD. However, the 
minimal impact upon units warrants a rating of five. 
f. Summary 
Unloading containers at the SPOD during sustainment 
operations results in the fastest turnaround time for the 
container.  However, the problems associated with a lack of 
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customer service and possible road network congestion make 
this option less desirable during the sustainment phase. 
Under this scenario, the force structure exists to make better 
overall use of the system and benefit the customer by moving 
the containers to lower echelons. 
2.  Ship Containers to Echelons Above Corps 
This course of action is similar in substance to the 
methods  outlined  under  previous  scenarios.    However, 
significant differences exist regarding most of the criteria 
under this option. 
a. Customer Service 
Again, in a mature theater of operations, the corps 
will be fighting a fluid battle in a developed theater. 
Containers that are delivered to the EAC area still somewhat 
limit the flexibility and response time of the corps to fill 
customer demands. Therefore, a rating of three is warranted 
for this criterion. 
b. Force Structure 
The force structure will be in place to easily 
handle containers under this scenario. However, moving 
containers in the field environments of EAC forces is not as 
effortless as conducting those same operations in the SPOD. 
Therefore, a rating of four is appropriate. 
c. Container Optimization 
Containers should still be optimized as in previous 
scenarios, for the same reasons discussed earlier. A rating 
of five is therefore given. 
d. MHE Efficiency- 
Shipment  of containers to EAC levels should not pose 
a problem in the mature theater with handling assets still 
abundant in proportion to levels during other scenarios 
discussed earlier. However, the transit time of MHE will 
still have a negative effect on the full use of the equipment. 
Therefore, a rating of four is appropriate. 
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e. Congestion 
Congestion will be a minor factor in the EAC area, 
as discussed previously. However, the potential still exists 
for less efficient transport methods to clog road networks. 
For this reason, a rating of four is appropriate. 
f. Summary 
The increase in customer service is significant when 
compared with the option of unloading containers at the SPOD. 
However, in the developed theater, the 40 foot containers can 
be handled more readily at lower echelons. Therefore, the 
option of shipping 40 foot containers to the EAC level is 
good, but not the best. 
3.  Ship Containers to the Corps 
Shipping containers to corps level appears to be the best 
course of action under this scenario. The specific criteria 
weights are now discussed. 
a. Customer Service 
As in previous scenarios, the customer service 
levels are more favorable as the containers are moved to lower 
echelons. Therefore, a rating of four is appropriate for this 
criterion. 
b. Force Structure 
The critical element of force structure is the 
allocation of the CTCs to the corps for the container handling 
mission. As discussed previously, once follow-on forces 
arrive, the CTCs will be task organized to the corps for use 
as appropriate. Because of the MHE augmentation, a rating of 
four is warranted for this criterion. 
c. Container Optimization 
Containers can still be optimized when shipping 40 
foot containers to the corps level for the reasons discussed 
earlier. The corps is large enough to provide a steady demand 
for full 40 foot containers.  However, turnaround time will 
54 
still be greater than with the two previous courses of action. 
Therefore, a rating of four is given. 
d. MHE Efficiency 
Since the CTCs will be operating in the corps area, 
the demand for handling assets will keep the equipment 
operating on a fairly continuous basis. The only possible 
delays include the transit times as noted earlier to move 
among different locations. For this reason, a rating of four 
is appropriate. 
e. Congestion 
As noted previously, congestion will increase as the 
40 foot containers move to lower echelons. However, the 
increased vehicle size may result in fewer numbers of less 
efficient transport vehicles on the road at any given time. 
Since these areas seem to balance themselves, a rating of 
three is given. 
f. Summary 
Shipping 40 foot containers to the corps level under 
sustainment operations is possible because of the increased 
handling capability gained by augmentation from the CTCs. 
Without this augmentation, handling containers at the corps 
level would be very difficult. 
4.  Ship Containers to the Division 
Shipping containers to the division level under this 
scenario presents no significant differences in evaluative 
methods from the scenario of surge movement of organic unit 
equipment. The only possible difference that may impact upon 
this course of action under sustainment operations is the 
augmentation of the corps by the CTCs. However, there is no 
guarantee that this augmentation will ever manifest itself at 
the division level in significant numbers to warrant 
additional consideration. Therefore, all ratings for the 
criteria under this course of action are identical to the 
ratings  provided under surge movement  of  organic unit 
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equipment.   The division still does not have sufficient 
capability to handle 40 foot containers adequately. 
5.  Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis conducted on this scenario model 
revealed three criteria which were potentially sensitive to 
changing weights. Those criteria were customer service, 
container optimization and congestion. 
The customer service criterion became sensitive at a 
weight of three, where the best solution then became a tie 
between shipping the containers to EAC level or to the corps 
level. In other words, if customer service was deemed to be 
of equal importance as force structure, the best choice would 
be to unload 40 foot containers at EAC level or the corps 
level. However, it is clear that customer service must be 
weighted most heavily of all the criteria for reasons 
discussed in Chapter III. 
The container optimization criterion became sensitive at 
a weighting of three, with a strategy tie again between 
shipping to the EAC or corps levels. However, as noted 
previously, force structure and customer service must be the 
two key criteria of importance in this analysis. 
The congestion criterion became sensitive at a weight of 
two, where the best choices were either shipping the 
containers to EAC or corps level. In other words, if the 
aspect of congestion was deemed so critical as to warrant a 
weighting of a factor of two, then two best solutions existed. 
However, it is difficult to place congestion on the same level 
of emphasis as the other criteria for the reasons discussed in 
Chapter III. 
In summary, while this scenario model did show some 
sensitivity to changing criteria weights, the changes would 
have to occur in highly unlikely areas of emphasis. 
Therefore, the model may be considered valid as presented for 
use as an evaluative tool. 
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D.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this analysis, three scenarios were presented with 
four possible courses of action listed for each scenario 
regarding the shipment of 40 foot containers. The three 
scenarios presented were surge movement of organic unit 
equipment, surge movement of general cargo, and sustainment 
shipment of general cargo.  The four courses of action were: 
• Unload containers at the SPOD. 
• Ship containers to EAC level. 
• Ship containers to corps level. 
• Ship containers to division level. 
When considering the movement of organic unit equipment, 
the best alternative was to ship the 40 foot containers no 
further than EAC level. The rationale was primarily that the 
units could not handle containers adequately below that level. 
The shipment of surge containers carrying general cargo 
was also best completed by sending 40 foot containers no 
further than EAC level. The rationale was similar to the 
discussion regarding shipment of organic unit equipment. 
Finally, the shipment of sustainment supplies could best 
be completed by moving 4 0 foot containers to the corps area. 
This level of shipment is made possible by the arrival of CTCs 
in the corps area in the mature theater of operations. 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Containerization will play a significant role in the 
movement of units and equipment to contingency theaters of 
operation in the forseeable future. As such, it is vital to 
develop and refine transportation doctrine and systems to gain 
the most benefits from containerized operations. 
The Army is moving toward a 20 foot standard container, 
but the commercial industry has been shifting to a 40 foot 
standard for many years. It is still unclear whether these 
divergent paths will adversely affect military 
containerization. 
Clearly, the Army would prefer not to use 40 foot 
containers if at all possible. The areas of research into 
past problems of handling 40 foot containers validate the Army 
position that 40 foot containers are difficult to manage in a 
military wartime context. This difficulty arises as a result 
of the requirement for military units to remain mobile in 
their task organizations. As such, units do not have the 
material handling equipment to conduct movement of 40 foot 
containers. 
The trend in military transportation developments has 
been to improve the delivery and transport methods of vehicles 
capable of carrying 20 foot containers. Therefore, the Army 
should continue to move toward standardizing the 2 0 foot 
container for contingency operations, and thus minimizing the 
use of 40 foot containers. 
Since research demonstrated a probable existing 
requirement for employment of 40 foot containers for 
contingencies, the Army must specifically address this issue. 
However, no single doctrinal system of employment of 
containers will fit into every scenario envisioned for a 
contingency theater of operations. Nevertheless, general 
concepts may be applied toward the potential employment of 40 
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foot containers in any theater of operations. These concepts 
specifically relate to the shipment of 40 foot containers to 
various locations in the theater during different phases of an 
operation. 
As a general rule, the transportation system should 
ensure that no unit deploys to a theater of operations with 
organic unit equipment in 40 foot containers. Analysis has 
shown that 40 foot containers are extremely difficult to 
handle at the corps and lower level during surge deployments 
of both general supplies and organic unit equipment. The 20 
foot container appears to be better suited for this aspect of 
transportation operations. Clearly, the 40 foot container is 
not the recommended solution to forward movement of equipment 
and supplies at this early stage of a potential conflict. 
Furthermore, 40 foot containers should be shipped only as 
far as the corps area during sustainment operations, where 
they would be unloaded and returned to the transportation 
system for further missions. 
The recommendation to ship 40 foot containers to the 
corps level during sustainment operations rests largely upon 
the successful fielding of the Cargo Transfer Companies as 
they are now envisioned in both structure and mission 
statements. Should either of these aspects change 
significantly prior to the requirement for employment in a 
theater of operations, the level of shipment of 40 foot 
containers must also be addressed. At the tactical level of 
war, the availability of MHE is vital to the ability to 
accomplish the 40 foot container movement mission. 
Other areas of significance were analyzed in the context 
of providing the means of delivering supplies to the customer. 
These areas included the optimization of containers as well as 
effects of container movements on road congestion in the 
theater. However, all other considerations are secondary to 
the issue of providing a customer with prompt, effective 
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movement of his supplies and equipment in such a fashion that 
enables the commander to accomplish his mission. The customer 
service aspect of transportation operations must be the 
primary consideration when contemplating alternative courses 
of action regarding the movement of 40 foot containers. Only 
in this fashion will the movement of units be most effectively 
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